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The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that all standardized derivatives products be regulated in
most instances by requiring that these trades be fully transparent and backed by adequate capital.
How will we know whether these regulatory measures are protecting financial markets from a
further destabilizing systemic breakdown?
Background: The Economic Meltdown as Failure of Regulation
Although many factors contributed to the financial meltdown of 2007 and 2008, principal
among them was the collapse of the market in over-the-counter (―OTC‖) derivatives. The OTC
market in credit default swaps provided the trigger that launched the mortgage crisis, credit
crisis, and systemic financial crisis that threatened to implode the global financial system, were it
not for a trillion dollar U.S. taxpayer intervention.1 At the time of the crisis, this market was
estimated to have a notional value of $596 trillion, including approximately $58 trillion in credit
default swaps (―CDSs‖),2 yet federal regulators (and most state regulators) were barred by a
federal statute from ensuring stability in these transactions.
Swaps and the Economic Meltdown
CDSs were the last step in a subprime securitization process that came to undermine the
economy. A counterparty investing in a CDS paid a ―premium‖ for another counterparty to
―guarantee‖ that another financial instrument, a collateralized debt obligation (―CDO‖), would
not fail. Thus, a CDS can be seen as a form of insurance for the success of a CDO. CDOs, in
turn, involved the ―pulling together and dissection into ‗tranches‘ of huge numbers of [mortgagebacked securities (―MBSs‖)],‖ based for their part on mortgage loans and, in the years before the
crisis, subprime mortgages in particular.3
Importantly, by ―reframing the form of risk (e.g., from subprime mortgages to MBSs to
CDOs),‖ investors, including those providing the guarantees through CDSs, thought that their
investments were safe. This problem was compounded by ―misleadingly high evaluations‖ by
credit rating agencies and, of course, the insurance provided by CDSs. In addition, issuers of
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CDSs depended on an assumption that housing prices would never go down, so that they would
never have to pay the guarantees they were providing.4
Because CDSs were widely understood to be risk-free, financial institutions began
writing ―naked‖ CDSs to investors who had no direct investment in CDOs or MBSs. That is, for
a small premium, investors bet that the mortgage-based instruments would fail, and they would
receive a payment if they did. Estimates suggest that before the crisis, there were as many
―naked‖ CDSs as those based on actual risk. In another surreal step, some financial institutions
also created ―synthetic‖ CDOs, where investors ―bet‖ on the value of a CDO in which they had
no financial interest. Both of these investments were bets that mortgages would not be paid.5
All of this came to a head when housing prices began to plummet. Homeowners began to
default on loans, leading to the failure of CDOs and triggering obligations of CDS issuers.
Synthetic CDOs and naked CDSs added exponentially to the obligations owed. But because they
believed that the guarantees would never be needed, issuers had not set aside sufficient capital to
pay them off and therefore could not. In addition, because the investments were not reported to
regulators, both the government and the financial community were surprised by the size of the
market, which led to uncertainty and a tightening of credit. All of this resulted in the downward
cycle of the economic meltdown, exacerbated by the fact that CDOs and CDSs existed not just in
the subprime mortgage market, but in most credit markets.6
Failure of Regulation
As of 2008, no state or federal agency regulated the swaps market. Although the
Commodity Exchange Act (―CEA‖) required that futures contracts be traded on publicly
transparent and fully regulated exchanges, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
―removed OTC derivative transactions…from all requirements of exchange trading and
clearing.‖7 Federal law also preempted state gaming and anti-bucket shop laws, which might
have brought naked CDSs and synthetic CDOs under state regulation. Finally, CDSs were not
regulated as insurance, in part because those engaged in them avoided calling them such, and so
they were not subject to state insurance regulations.8
Were swaps regulated under the CEA, they would have been subject to several key
requirements: (1) public and transparent pricing; (2) disclosure of the real trading parties in
interest to the federal government; (3) regulation of intermediaries, i.e. brokers and their
employers, including stringent rules as to capital adequacy and customer protection; (4) self
regulation by exchanges directly supervised by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(―CFTC‖) to detect unlawful trading activity; (5) prohibitions against fraud, market manipulation
and excessive speculation; and (6) enforcement of all these requirements by the CFTC, state
governments, and private rights of action.9
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Dodd-Frank‘s Solutions for Regulating Swaps
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (―Dodd-Frank Act‖) into law.10 The Dodd-Frank Act transforms
the regulation of OTC derivatives by requiring that swaps be subject to clearing and exchange
trading as well as capital and margin requirements.
The Act first requires that all ―swap dealers‖ and ―major swap participants‖ register with
the banking regulators, CFTC, and/or Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖).11 A swap
dealer is an entity that (1) holds itself out as such, (2) makes a market in swaps, (3) regularly
enters into swaps for its own account in the ordinary course of business, or (4) engages in
activity generally recognized in the trade as dealing in swaps.12 Major swap participants are
entities that are not swap dealers and (1) maintain a substantial position in swaps, excluding
transactions used to hedge commercial risk, (2) create substantial counterparty exposure that
could undermine the banking system or financial markets, or (3) are highly leveraged, not subject
to capital requirements, and maintain a substantial position in swaps.13
Registered swap dealers and major swap participants must disclose any material risks of
swaps and any material incentives or conflicts of interests.14 In addition, they must meet capital
and margin requirements and conform to business conduct rules, including those related to fraud
and market manipulation, that are set by the agencies (clearing organizations and exchanges can
supplement those requirements).15 They must also conform to position limits on their trading
volume in commodity swaps, which are set by exchanges within standards set by the agencies.16
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires that swaps transactions be publicly reported.17
The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes clearing and exchange trading requirements on
standardized swap transactions. Both are central features of CEA regulation of futures. Under a
clearing system, a clearing facility stands between the buyer and seller of a contract to guarantee
each against failure of the other party. Clearing facilities have a strong incentive to establish and
enforce the capital adequacy of traders, including through the collection of margins, i.e., deposits
on the amount at risk in a trade.18 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the regulatory agencies decide
whether specific types of swaps must be cleared, and designated clearing organizations
(―DCOs‖) must inform their regulatory agencies which types of swaps they plan to clear.19
DCOs must allow ―non-discriminatory‖ access to clearing.20 Swaps that are required to be
cleared must also be traded on a designated contract market, securities exchange, or swap
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execution facility (―SEF‖).21 Importantly, however, swaps do not have to be cleared or exchange
traded if no existing entity will list a particular swap product.22
The Dodd-Frank Act contains a narrow ―end-user‖ exception designed to ease the burden
on businesses using swaps to mitigate risk associated with their activities. For example, airlines
buying fuel may use swaps to hedge against price increases. The exception applies to parties that
are not financial entities, are using swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, and have notified
the CFTC and/or SEC as to how they meet financial obligations of non-cleared swaps. It does
not cover swaps in which both parties are major swap participants, swap dealers, or other
financial entities.23
Despite this exception, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes its reporting and margin
requirements for all swaps, whether or not they are cleared. The swaps must be reported to a
registered swap data repository, the CFTC or the SEC and must occur as soon as technologically
possible after execution.24 Margin requirements technically apply to all swaps, although the
Act‘s sponsors have stated that they are not intended to apply to end-users.25
One of the more controversial provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act is the Lincoln or ―PushOut‖ Rule, which prohibits federal assistance to any bank operating as a swap dealer. Federal
assistance is defined broadly to include, inter alia, federal deposit insurance or access to the
Federal Reserve‘s discount window.26 Although the Push-Out Rule does not take effect for two
years, its logical consequence will be to encourage banks to ―push out‖ or divest their swap
divisions, so that they can maintain access to federal banking resources.
Similarly, the Volcker Rule generally prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary
trading (that is, trading that is on its own behalf and not a customer‘s) or acquiring or retaining
an interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund.27 While the Volcker Rule will not be
implemented for at least two years,28 the consequence is that these activities will also move from
banks to other smaller and less systemically risky entities.
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How Will We Know If the Dodd-Frank Act Is Working?
Dodd-Frank has been hailed as important and comprehensive financial reform.29 But like
many reforms before it, proof of its success lies not in the text of the law, but in how it changes
the status quo. Imagine a world five years from now: How will we know if the Act has
successfully changed the landscape of the U.S. financial system? How will we know if we, as
consumers, are better protected against another economic meltdown?
1) 90% of standardized over-the-counter derivatives will be cleared and exchange traded,
and just 10% will be exempt based on the end-user exclusion.
The basic rule of the Dodd-Frank Act is that swaps must be cleared and exchange traded.
One of the few exceptions is for end users. As CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has said, the
―exception should be narrowly defined to include only nonfinancial entities that use swaps as an
incidental part of their business to hedge actual commercial risks. Even though individual
transactions with a financial counterparty may seem insignificant, in aggregate, they can affect
the health of the entire system.‖30
To achieve this end, regulators should carefully consider how they define hedging for
commercial risk. A model for doing so may come from proposed regulations from January
2010, which would have imposed potential speculative position limits on futures contracts for
certain energy commodities.31 Suggesting an exemption for bona fide hedging, the CFTC relied
on a definition from regulation 1.3(z), under which bona fide hedging includes ―transactions or
positions [that] normally represent a substitute for transactions to be made or positions to be
taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel, and where they are economically
appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of a commercial
enterprise.‖ Further, the CFTC emphasized that ―[u]nder the proposed regulations, traders
holding positions pursuant to a bona fide hedge exemption would generally be prohibited from
also trading speculatively. This definition limits the end-user exemption to those whose intent is,
ultimately, to purchase or sell a physical commodity, rather than a bank.‖32 Such an approach
would be sufficiently narrow to limit the ability of entities to circumvent regulation.
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2) Swap dealers or major swap participants will have no more than 20% ownership of any
derivative clearing organization (“DCO”), board of trade (“BOT”), or swap execution
facility (“SEF”).
One of the main principals shaping derivatives regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act is to
provide free and open access to clearing and exchange trading by financial institutions.33 Simply
put, clearing and exchange trading are designed to reduce risk by providing price transparency,
requiring that investors set aside adequate capital in case of default, and producing public
information on who is involved in trading and to what extent.34 But if large numbers of trading
institutions are excluded from clearing organizations or exchanges, the protections otherwise
contributed by these protections will be undermined.
Already, large swap dealers and banks are working to limit access and competition from
smaller entities by creating ways to exert control over DCOs, BOTs, and SEFs. According to the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, just five U.S. banks represent 98% of the total amount
invested by banks in swaps.35 In many cases, clearinghouses and exchanges are owned by banks,
including those that are the five dominant swaps investors.36 In an apparent attempt to
discourage competition, the banks, in their roles as owners, have imposed unnecessarily high
capital requirements or other thresholds, far in excess of that needed for conservative risk
management, as minimums for satisfying the clearinghouse membership eligibility, in order to
keep smaller, but highly credit worthy institutions out of the clearing process.37
While several proposals have been raised, a simple solution to this problem is to curtail
the influence and control of large banks over clearing and exchange institutions by capping their
ownership at a maximum of 20%. The 20% ownership restriction is similar to an amendment
proposed in 2009 by Representative Stephen Lynch and included in the House version of the
Dodd Frank bill. This amendment would have restricted the beneficial ownership interest to an
aggregate of 20% of all swap dealers and major swap participants, as well as those associated
with them.38 Although the Lynch amendment was stripped from Dodd Frank by the Conference
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Committee before final passage, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFTC and SEC to adopt rules
eliminating conflicts of interest arising from the control of clearing and exchange institutions
where a swap dealer or major swap participant has ―a material debt or material equity
investment.‖39 In carrying out the duties expressly delegated by the Act, the CFTC and SEC
have complete and unfettered discretion to create restrictions on ownership—including
numerical caps.40 These restrictions would be effective and clear tools for ensuring that large
banks could not employ control tactics such as anti-competitive policies over clearing and
exchange institutions in a manner that would exclude smaller participants.
Some observers have argued that requiring an independent board of governors—that is,
one that is not comprised of banks, but outside experts or other members—would effectively
avoid the problem of overly concentrated power.41 However, a recent example shows the futility
of relying on that approach alone: In 2009, ICE Trust acquired the Clearing Corp., a
clearinghouse owned by nine of the largest swap trading banks. Although ICE Trust claims to be
managed by an independent board, the acquisition involved a profit-sharing scheme in which
these banks not only have an equity ownership in ICE Trust, but, in addition, they will receive
collectively in their own names 50% of the profits. In addition, the founding banks will be
subject to a pricing structure distinct from that applied to other banks.42
3) All large financial institutions that deal in or buy swaps would be subject to strict
capital requirements and rigorous business conduct rules.
As noted above, swap dealers and major swap participants must conform to capital
requirements and business conduct rules set by the agencies. As they define the terms ―swap
dealers‖ and ―major swap participants,‖ agencies should aim to capture the top 200 or so entities
dealing in derivatives. As Chairman Gensler recently stated, ―initial estimates are that there
could be in excess of 200 entities that will seek to register as swap dealers [under the DoddFrank Act],‖ including ―[209] global and regional banks currently known to offer swaps‖ as
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―Primary Members‖ of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (―ISDA‖).43 These
entities should be encompassed by the definitions adopted by the CFTC.
To achieve this number, agencies should consider how they define several terms. First,
the CFTC and SEC should adopt a definition used by ISDA for deciding which institutions
should be registered. The ISDA definition includes all business organizations and entities that
deal in derivatives except those who do so ―solely for the purposes of risk hedging or asset or
liability management.‖44 In adopting this definition, the agencies should also clarify that it does
not exclude entities that claim to use derivatives for risk hedging or asset or liability management
but for whom the transactions could materially affect their financial condition based on the
significant revenue generated by the swaps.
Another key issue will be how to determine whether a firm enters into swaps in the
course of ―regular business,‖ because swap dealers do not include persons who enter into swaps
for their own account, as long as they do not do so as part of their regular business.45 To ensure
that regulation will cover the largest dealers, agencies should define regular business based on an
institution‘s annual average trading revenue from all swaps activities, as a percentage of total
trading revenue. This percentage provides insight as to the nature of an institution‘s business, and
agencies should use it to compare the relative positions of various institutions as well as the
importance of swaps to a particular firm. However, because trading revenue from swaps
activities is currently unavailable to the public or regulators, in order to allow regulators to assess
this percentage, the agencies should require all entities that have annual trading revenue over one
billion dollars to provide the CFTC with audited financial statements reporting gross and net
trading revenue from all swap activities. The percentage triggering regulation should be two
percent, and the percentage should be adjusted accordingly based on the reported data going
forward.
The term ―major swap participant‖ encompasses three broad categories: entities that
maintain a substantial position in ―major swaps categories,‖ those that pose substantial risk to
counterparties, and those that are highly leveraged.
Here, ―major swaps categories‖ should be broken down to reflect relatively specific
commodity products, so that entities that are heavily involved in a commodity—and thus can
influence prices—do not escape regulation by ―hiding‖ within a larger category. For example,
the categories should be defined not just as ―energy‖ or even ―crude oil,‖ but should be broken
down to a precise commodity product, i.e., ―light sweet crude oil.‖ In addition, ―substantial
position‖ should be measured by the notional value of an entity‘s swap positions, as a proportion
of the notional value of all swaps positions held by all entities. This can paint of picture of how
concentrated risk is, and regulators can use it to ensure that the firms with the most risk are
covered by regulation.
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Entities creating substantial counterparty exposure can be determined by looking at two
factors: (1) how much is currently at risk in case of default, measured by the market value of
contracts, and (2) how much could potentially be at risk in the future, over the life of the
contract.46 To assess both, agencies should consider how many counterparties are at risk through
swaps transactions with a given entity—a measure of interconnectedness, or the extent to which
an institution‘s failure would have a ripple effect into the overall economy. In addition, agencies
should consider the financial stability of counterparties, to capture transactions that involve one
or very few counterparties but may still create substantial risk.
Highly leveraged entities can be identified based on entities‘ current credit risk relative to
their capital.47 Where agencies find that entities have taken on too much risk, they should restrict
them from additional swaps activities and/or require an increase in available capital. This will
prevent an excessively leveraged firm from triggering significant market dysfunction.
4) Proprietary trading, hedge and equity funds, and credit default swaps would be moved
from large banks to smaller structures with smaller potential impacts on the overall
financial system.
As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act includes both the ―Volker Rule,‖ which prohibits
banks from engaging in proprietary trading or ownership of hedge or equity funds, and the
―Lincoln‖ or ―Push-Out Rule,‖ which requires bank holding companies to establish separate
affiliated corporations for swaps dealings in unregulated CDSs in order to benefit from federal
assistance. Although both provisions have long lead times before implementation, they are
already having their intended effects.
In anticipation of the Volcker Rule, for example, a private equity division at Bank of
America left in the fall of 2010 to form a new hedge fund.48 Even before the final bill was
passed, Citigroup sold a private equity fund, and it is considering moving at least one of its
proprietary trading units into a separate hedge fund.49 At Goldman Sachs, which will also
disband its proprietary trading units, proprietary traders are reportedly leaving to join new or
existing hedge funds.50 JP Morgan recently announced it will shut down its proprietary trading
in commodities as a first step in closing down all proprietary trading.51 All of these firms, and
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traders within them, have stated that they are taking action for the sake of uncertainty, so that
they are not ―worrying about what they are going to be doing a couple of years from now.‖52
This movement is healthy—a sign that the Volcker Rule will have a powerful impact.
The transactions covered by the Rule will move from banks that are too big to fail (―TBTF‖) to
more diverse and less systemically risky parts of the market, including non-TBTF institutions
such as hedge funds. As the Senate Committee on Banking suggested, this provision ―will
reduce the scale, complexity, and interconnectedness of those banks that are now actively
engaged in proprietary trading, or have hedge fund or private equity exposure. [It] will reduce
the possibility that banks will be too big or too complex to resolve in an orderly manner should
they fail.‖53 In addition, investment banks will not be able to create risky financial products and
sell them to investors, while holding on to the other side of the bets to make profit at customers‘
expense – an act that Goldman Sachs was accused of by the SEC.54
The Lincoln or Push-Out Rule is also already driving risky trades into more diverse
structures. JP Morgan, for example, is spinning off its high-risk derivatives into a unit that will
be separate from its other investments.55 This movement is healthy, because speculation in
derivatives such as swaps has contributed significantly to price volatility in commodities and
commodity index funds, an effect that has increased with the influx of more speculation,
including ―the rapid growth of index investment,‖ in commodity futures markets.56 To the extent
that smaller and more diverse entities engage in such speculation, they will have a lessened
impact on commodity index fund prices, simply because they have less weight to throw around.
Moreover, where commodity index funds do have swaps, they will be regulated.
5) Energy and food prices would be explained by market fundamentals rather than
unknowns that may be attributable to excessive speculation.
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFTC and SEC to set position limits on the amount of
swaps trading that entities can conduct, with the goal of limiting speculation and subsequent
volatility in commodities.57 Speculation can unmoor prices from market fundamentals such as
supply and demand. In essence, prices are usually determined by a healthy tension between
commercial users, who want low prices, and producers, who want high ones. Speculators,
however, are unconcerned about what a fair price for a commodity might be, but rather want
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prices to move dramatically in the direction of their bets.58 Position limits can minimize the role
of speculation by limiting both its volume and impact, allowing market fundamentals to be the
primary driver of prices.
The impact of speculation on oil pricing was evident between 2007 and 2009, when
prices rose from $65 per barrel in June 2007, to $145 in July 2008, to the $30s in winter 2008-09,
shifting to the $60s and $70s in 2009. More recently, oil has been trading at $70-82.59
Economists have ascribed volatility to speculation in oil during this period.60 In fact, in 2006, a
Senate committee found that if fundamentals alone explained prices, it would trade at about
$50/barrel, rather than the $75 that it did at the time.61 At the current level, economists can
explain relatively small changes based on market fundamentals.62 Position limits would help
maintain such market rationality.
6) Even swaps that do not clear and exchange trade should be subject to appropriate
capital and transparency requirements.
As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act affords the CFTC and SEC the authority to require
that uncleared swaps, even those not subject to clearing and exchange-trading requirements,
adhere to ―real-time reporting‖ and, if necessary, margin requirements established by regulation.
In particular, those swaps that are not accepted for clearing at a derivatives clearing organization
must be reported to a registered swap data repository or, if no swap data repository will accept
the report, to regulators in a manner that does not disclose the business transactions and market
positions of any person.63 The Act defines ―real-time reporting‖ as public dissemination of data
relating to a transaction, including price and volume, as soon as technologically practicable after
the time at which the swap transaction has been executed.64
Also, the Act authorizes the CFTC and SEC to make swap transaction and pricing data
available to the public in such forms and at such times as are deemed appropriate to enhance
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price discovery.65 In light of this, Chairman Gensler has recently stated that ―[the CFTC]
anticipate[s] rules in [the data reporting] area to require swap data repositories to perform their
core function of collecting and maintaining swaps data and making it directly and electronically
available to regulators. . . . It will be important that swaps data be collected not only when the
transaction occurs, but also for each lifecycle event and valuation over its duration.‖66
Under these reporting requirements, prudential and market regulators will receive all
relevant and necessary data in a timely manner. As such, the reporting requirements are
significant because they are one of the only ways that regulators and other observers can assess
whether derivatives are significant enough to pose risk to the market through their size or the
interconnectedness of counterparties. Indeed, the lack of reporting and transparency was a main
cause of regulators‘ inability to anticipate the effect of swaps on the financial markets in 2007
and 2008.67
Conclusion
The true test of the Dodd-Frank Act is simple but profound: Has it made the economy
any safer from the threat of another economic meltdown? If so, we expect to see each of the
following achievements:
90% of standardized OTC derivatives are cleared and exchange traded, with just 10%
exempt based on the end-user exemption.
Swap dealers or major swap participants have no more than 20% ownership of any
derivative clearing organization, board of trade, or swap execution facility.
All large swap dealers and major swap participants are registered with the agencies
and subject to strict capital requirements and rigorous business conduct rules.
Proprietary trading, hedge and equity funds, and swaps trading are moved from large
banks to smaller structures with smaller potential impacts on the overall financial
system.
Energy and food prices are explained by market fundamentals rather than unknowns
that may be attributable to excessive speculation.
Even swaps that are not cleared or exchange traded are subject to real-time reporting
and margin requirements.
The Act has the potential to meet these standards, if regulators make the most of the tools
available to them.
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